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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LEHI IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
CLARENCE T. JONES and ED. H. 
WATSON, State Engineer of the State 
of Utah, 
Defendants and Respondents , 
CASE NO. 
7189 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURl/£ ON REPLY OF STATE 
ENGINEER AND REPLY OF RESPONDENT JONES 
FISHER HARRIS 
Amicus Curiae 
(All italics or other indications of emphasis are ours) 
Briefs in answer to that of Amicus Curire have now been 
filed by Respondents, and this is our reply. We think it proper 
to so designate it, for, though filed subsequent to the briefs 
of the parties, our first was in the nature of an original brief 
in the cause on appeal, and raised and discussed only those 
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4 
matters already raised by Appellant. It is true, however, that 
those matters were substantially elaborated and that they were 
presented in somewhat different light. It was therefore proper 
we think, but without offering our opinion as of any conse-
quence, that Respondents were afforded opportunity to answer. 
That we should now reply seems equally appropriate; not only 
because of our situation relative to the cause, but also because 
of our relation as Amicus Curire, which we trust we shall not 
forget. 
Respondents have devoted considerable space and effort 
toward the limitation and definition of our ((role and status." 
(Motion of Respondents as to Amicus Curire and Reply of 
Respondent Jones, pages 7 and 9). It is said that we have pre-
sented ((numerous new and controverted matters, both of law 
and fact''; that we purport to ( (represent Provo River Water 
Users Association, but speak also for the United States, the 
Public Interest, and also for other parties including the parties 
to this action.'' They ask by the motion to ((be advised as to 
whether a new party has been now injected and is now being 
represented", and, in the Reply of Respondent Jones, urge 
that Provo River Water Users Association' cannot become a 
party by reason of the fact that its Counsel has appeared as 
Amicus Curire. ((Amicus Curire is restricted," it is said, uto 
suggestions relative to matters apparent on the record or to 
matters of practice. His principal function is to aid the Court 
on questions of law." 
With this last, we are in perfect accord. The Respondent 
objects to Provo River Water Users' Association becoming or 
being considered as a party, and it accedes to the objection; 
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the objection is well, though quite unnecessarily, taken; and 
,ve shall endeavor to assist the court to the best of our ability. 
As to the Hnumerous new and controverted matters, both 
of law and fact" presented by us: The Court may recall that at 
the oral argument Respondents were challenged to ((name 
one .. , but that none were. There are none. We have insisted 
from the outset, and still do, that there is, and since the filing of 
the Jones applications, there never has been but one issue, 
viz: Have the statutory prerequisites to their approval been 
satisfied? The answer to the question depends, of course, 
upon the record made before the trial court; depends, of course, 
upon what is explicitly and implicitly in the record and upon 
the legal effects resulting-resulting as either immediately 
decisive of the ultimate issue or in effects upon which that 
issue in turn depends. 
As for whom we speak: We happen to be Counsel for 
the Provo River Water Users Association, and, except for 
that fact, it is improbable that we should have noticed the case 
of Lehi Irrigation Company vs. Jones and Ed. H. Watson, 
State Engineer, or, if noticed, that we should . have been 
troubled by its possibilities. But however that may be, we 
have noticed it, and we have been and are troubed by its pos-
sibilities; but our motivation is of no consequence. What may 
be of consequence is the validity of our analysis and reasoning, 
which, in result, is something quite impersonal. It is true as 
charged that we speak for the Provo River Water Users Asso-
ciation and the United States, and for the Public Interest as 
well. In our original brief we have expressed them inter-
changeably, regarding them, as we do, as practically identical 
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6 
in their relation to this appeal. Nevertheless, what we have 
already said, and what we shall say, might as well have 
emanated from any other, . for all of it is in support of the 
proposition that on the record no case for the approval of the 
Jones applications was made in the Court below-something 
which may properly be affirmed at any time and by anyone. 
As we put it in our original brief (pages 6-7): 
·'That no cause of action has been stated or, if stated, 
that none has been made by the evidence, may be brought to 
attention at any time, and the court may notice the fact in 
either case and act accordingly though it was not noticed or 
mentioned by parties or counsel; and no court would close its 
mind to these matters merely because reminded of them by a 
defeated litigant, or even by a stranger." 
It seems not altogether impossible that the difference 
between Respondents and Amicus Curire is wider in respect 
of the proposition just stated than it is as to the merits. This 
very clearly appears from Respondent's original brief (page 6) 
under ((I. The point now presented is that Appellant cannot 
here for the first time raise the claim briefed"; and again from 
the Reply (Jones, page 11) : 
C( • • • but this is a private suit by one protestant and 
appellant claiming it would be aggrieved by the appropriations 
sought." 
And still again (page 13): 
''In this case we had only to meet the claim, as alleged, 
of Appellant's diligence right. The trial court had only to 
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determine whether that clain1 required the Engineer to reject 
the application." 
·· This vie'vv that the case of Lehi Irrigation Company vs. 
Jones and Ed. H. Watson, State Engineer and others of its 
kind (all cases, for that matter) are private debates, to be 
decided on the basis of an oratorical contest, pervades the 
briefs of Respondent Jones. That they are regarded as involv-
ing no public interest is perfectly evident from the brief of 
the Special Assistant Attorney General (pages 3 and 9) : 
. . . it appeared by the pleadings simply to be a private 
dispute between two water users ... " 
··This case was presented to the State Enginee~ as a private 
dispute ... " 
This in face of the provisions of Chapter 3, Title 100, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943-among others impelling an 
opposite view, that in the interest of the State and the adminis-
tration of its water policies the State Engineer is not only· a 
proper but an indispensable party to the trial de novo in the 
District Court. 
Entirely aside, however, from the public aspect of the 
matter before the Engineer or the trial court: Whatever it 
may be that the statute requires to exist as prerequisites to 
the approval of an application, those prerequisites must be 
found by one or the other. They must be found to exist within 
that degree of certainty and within that extent of finality 
determined by this court as satisfying the expressed intent of 
the legislature; and if they are not found within those limits, 
no case for approval has been made, and the statute, as well 
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as basic principles. of la\v, requue that an application be 
rejected. 
In this view there is no sense in talking of the bringing 
in of new parties or in citing authorities to the effect that the 
interest of one not a party to a cause cannot be foreclosed by 
its result as between those who are parties. Neither is it at 
all helpful or relevant to multiply cases that the State Engineer 
is not a judicial officer and hence cannot adjudicate relative 
rights. So far as we know, no one claims or believes that he 
can. Respondents attribute such belief to us, but that is no 
more than one of a multitude of ccstraw men" held up to the 
court. 
To say, however, that new parties may not be brought 
into a cause as parties, by testimony or findings, is not to say 
that attention may not thus be directed to them, or that, having 
been thus noticed, they may not be the objects of judicial 
solicitude, or even that the fact of the interest of one not a 
party may not be decisive against the claim of one who is. 
Suppose, for example, that in the instant case all the testimony 
had been that all the waters in question had been appropriated 
pursuant to all the requirements of law by the famous John 
Smith, and all were being put to beneficial use by him from 
one year's end to the other. 
And to say that the interest of one not a party cannot 
be foreclosed by its result as between the parties, is quite 
different from a statement that his interest cannot be affected. 
For example, the Whitmore of Whitmore vs. Murray City, 
107 Utah 445, was not a party to the proceeding before the 
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State Engineer in response to which Murray City was granted 
the :right, as bet,veen it and the State, to move a point of 
diversion up stream. This Court held and declared in un-
equivocal terms that his rights relative to those of the City had 
not been foreclosed by the decision of the Engineer. But 
who will say they were not affected, or that they ought not 
to have been considered by the Engineers as decisively militating 
against the granting of Murray's application? Whitmore's 
rights were not foreclosed by the action of the State Engineer, 
but that action inevitably subjected him to trouble and anxiety 
and expense, and to the unfortunately unavoidable hazards 
of litigation which in the lower court went against him. 
True also that the State Engineer is an administrative 
officer and cannot make any final ajudication of relative rights 
either of parties before him or of others. This court has said 
so sufficiently often, and has even so decided clearly enough 
to convince the most reluctant. But it doesn't follow from 
this, as seems to be supposed by Respondents, that the Engineer 
is not, or that a trial court on appeal fro!Jl him is not, under 
obligation to examine and to make findings and decisions with 
consequences no different as to the matter before him than if 
he were a judicial officer and the parties affected were before 
him as the result of due process. The matter before him 
in common instance, and the matter before a trial court on 
appeal from him, is an application ((to acquire the right to 
the use of . . . unappropriated public water", and his :finding 
and his decision accordingly, that there is or is not ((unappro-
priated water in the proposed source" and that nthe proposed 
use will" or will Hnot impair existing rights", etc., is as final 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
and conclusive as to that nzatter as the finding and decision of 
any court from which there is right of appeal. If the applica-
tion is approved ((the applicant shall be authorized, on receipt 
thereof, to proceed with the construction of the necessary 
works and take all steps required to apply the water to the 
use named in the application and to perfect the propos,ed 
appropriation"; but ((if the application is rejected, the applicant 
shall take no steps toward the prosecution of the proposed 
work or the diversion and use of the public water so long as 
such rejection shall continue in force", (Section 10, Chapter 
3, Title 100, Utah Code Annotated, 1943) and, in the absence 
of appeal to the courts, that is the end of that. 
Fugitive expressions of this Court, misapplied and stripped 
of their context1 have lent color to the opinion that the office 
of State Engineer is little if anything more than one of record; 
that his obligations are otherwise perfunctory, and hence that 
the common practice of disclaimer in actions to which he is 
a party is entirely consistent with his official character. So 
also have they led to statements such as the following from 
the brief (pages 5-6 and elsewhere) of the Special Assistant 
Attorney General, and to similar statements in the original 
Respondent's brief to which he was a party. 
c]t is only where there is no probability that the 
application might be perfected that the State Engineer 
should deny the application. Such was the holding of 
the court in Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. vs. Kents Lake 
Res .. Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108. See Little Cotton-
wood v. Kimball, supra; Eardley V. Terry, supra". 
Such was not the holding of the Court in any of the cases 
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cited; neither is it the holding of any other case decided by the 
Supreme Court of Utah. If time will permit, we expect to 
demonstrate the validity of this statement of ours, and the 
careless inaccuracy of that quoted in1mediately above, as well 
as the following (Page 6 and elsewhere) : 
((The State Engineer should examine the application 
to ascertain the declared intent and, if there is any reason-
able probability to believe (sic) that a right might be 
perfected, the State Engineer has been told by this Court 
that he should approve the application." 
We regret the necessity of this rather long introduction 
to the principal immediate purpose of this brief-a careful 
examination of the decisions of this court in relation to the 
duties of the State Engineer in rejecting or approving an 
application made .. For the purpose of acquiring the right to 
use a portion of the unappropriated water of the State of 
Utah." But, looking again at the Reply briefs, we are con-
firmed as to its necessity, and as to the necessity of still more, 
for never before have we seen such effort to avoid, so many 
((straw men" created and demolished, or so much within 
quotations marks that is not quotation. 
It is not suggested that these things are of intrinsic im-
portance. Most of them are not; a few may J?e. All, however, 
are entanglements or obstacles in the way of the clear view 
which we hope to present. 
We quote first from pages 3 and 9 of the Reply of the 
Special Assistant Attorney General: 
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... It appeared by the pleadings simply to be a private 
dispute between two water users over the right to use waters 
then running to waste/' 
rrAt the time of the dispute the waters were running to 
waste." Now there isn't a scrap of evidence proving, tending 
to prove, or offered for the purpose of proving, that the 
((waters were running to waste." The State Engineer found 
as the applications allege, that they were tributary to Utah 
Lake. ··A more serious question is raised by the fact that these 
waters are tributary to Utah Lake." The trial court found the 
same thing in finding Jones' land adjacent to Dry Creek, and 
that the drainage after use was into it. (Findings of Fact 
Nos. 5 and 6.) 
Next from page 4 of the same brief: 
((The State Engineer thinks it would be unfortunate if 
the issues raised by the Amicus Curire were to be decided upon 
their merits here.'' 
In the first place, the State Engineer thinks nothing of 
the sort. He knows nothing at all of the case. The unfortunate 
fact is that, though the State Engineer knew, both personally 
and officially, of the claims and rights of the United States 
and the Provo River Water Users Association, the Special 
Assistant Attorney General either did not know or forgot about 
them. We take it, however, that the views of the State En-
gineer, if he had any, will not be quite decisive as to what 
issues this Court will decide. That same brief contains a 
number of the Court ·~ought" to do this, and the Court nought" 
to do that. 
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In the state of the confusion we are seeking to order and 
quiet, it is necessary to 'nlake son1e further comn1ent upon 
this attempt at avoidance. The issue raised by Amicus Curire 
in no real sense is raised by him at all. It is the statute that 
raises the issue. It is the elementary and fundamental rule 
of law that raises it. We merely notice and call attention to 
it. If in urging that the issues should not ((be decided on 
their merits here" is meant that this court ought not to make 
a final adjudication on the merits of the rights of the United 
States and the Provo River Water Users Association, we agree. 
No more should a final adjudication on the merits be made -in 
this than in any other case by the State Engineer or, on appeal 
from his decision, by the District Court. On the other hand 
-no less. In every case in which application is made ((to 
acquire the right to the use of any unappropriated public 
water in this state" the Engineer is required to determine that 
there is or is not ((unappropriated water in the proposed source" 
and whether "the proposed use will" or will nnot impair existing 
rights." It is the statute (Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 100, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943) that requires him to make such 
determination. Of unavoidable necessity his determination 
must be based upon the supply of the source and the nature 
and extent of the already existing rights to utilize it. To urge 
as does the Reply Brief above and as it does at greater length 
elsewhere (pages 13-14) is to argue that the Engineer's deter-
mination can be only one way~ To paraphrase: "An appli-
cation may be approved, because that result involves no 
adjudication of relative rights; but it may not be rejected 
because it does.'' 
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To continue: Reply of Respondent Jones, page 5: 
"Certainly, neither of these objecting parties can appro-
priate his (Jones) property for swamp storage of their water, 
if any they have." 
No one wants to. Neither the United States nor the Provo 
River Water Users Association has the slightest objection to 
the drainage from the Jones' lands of the waters they are 
entitled to use. On the contrary, the drainage of the Jones 
swamp is precisely what they wish. It is interference with 
the free flow of "Deer Creelt waters into Dry Creek and 
thence into Utah Lake to which they object. 
Jones Reply, pages 5-6: 
"In our first brief, we supported by direct author-
ities, three propositions. These were: 
C< 1. That the issue raised on appeal as to Govern-
ment filings on the Weber River could not, \vith any 
pleadings below, be raised for the first time on argu-
ment here. 
0 2. That the objection based on possible claims 
by a third party stranger to the action, is not available 
to appellant here. 
0 3. That on the merits, appellant's cairns, 
whether arising under this or under its diligent creek 
right, as pleaded, did not justify rejection of these 
applications. 
((Amicus Curire supports our statement that the 
issue was not raised by the pleadings below, and ap-
pellant makes no reply and no contention that it was. 
On the claim that was pleaded by it below, Amicus 
Curire says that it is (conceded by appellant' that the 
waters claimed have not been appropriated by it. 
( A.4) ; that it was established that appellant had no 
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right ( .:\..5); and refers to it later as ~a defeated liti-
gant' (A.7). 
((Our second point, as briefed and supported, is 
not contested at all, and the authorities cited ( 0. 8-12) 
are not challenged. These seem to entitle respondent 
to an affirmance of the judgtnent here. 
''The third point, on the merits as it relates to 
the appellant having no right to object to the ap-
provals under its claim, as pleaded, is not questioned 
by it, and is endorsed and enforced by amicus curire.'' 
Here we have a something· indeed. All of Respondent's 
propositions nsupported by direct authorities" have either been 
expressly admitted, have not been contested, or have been 
tcendorsed and enforced" by us. Were it not for the austerity 
of the court we should reply to this with a simple and appro-
priate expletive ________________ ! As it is, however, we are restrained 
to something more nearly classical, by Macaulay. ((A wise man 
might talk folly like this at his fireside; but that any human 
being, after having made such a joke, should write it down, 
and copy it out, and transmit it to the printer, and correct the 
proof sheets, and send it forth into the world, is enough to 
make us ashamed of our species." 
The complaint on appeal from the State Engineer alleged 
(Par. 5): 
'' 5. That plaintiff further alleges that there are no un-
appropriated waters arising from springs or spring areas 
tributary to said Dry Creek, within the areas as claimed by the 
defendant, Clarence T. Jones, or otherwise, and that the whole 
of said waters within said areas have been, and now are being 
put to a beneficial use by plaintiff here~' 
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This seems amply sufficient to ratse the issue of ((un-
appropriated water in the proposed source. But ·sufficient 
or not as to that, the case before the District Court is that 
which was before the State Engineer. It is to be tried de novo, 
and the issues are those made by the statute. But "since 
attention is directed to the pleadings, we notice that the answer 
of Respondent Jones contains no allegations of unappropriated 
water in the proposed source or that the proposed use will 
not impair existing rights. Not~ing, however, can be made of 
that, because the sole purpose of the so-called ((complaint" is 
to bring the application before the District Court, which 
determines on trial de novo precisely those issues made by 
the statute and in the first instance determined by the State 
Engineer. Eardley vs. Terry, 94 Utah 367. 
The principal effort of Respondent Jones is one in avoid-
ance .. The rights of Lehi Irrigation Company are not affected 
by approval of the application, and that is the end of the 
matter; never mind the statute. That is the sum of Respondent's 
contentions. ( ( . . . but this is a private suit by one protestant 
and appellant claiming it would be aggrieved by the appro-
priations sought. No one but the parties hereto is, or can be, 
affected by this law suit and it must be decided upon the claims 
and record made by the parties hereto" (Jones Reply, page 
11) ; and (we add in paraphrase) nthe decision must go to the 
winner of the debate between them, no matter how deficient 
that record may be. The statute has nothing to do with it." 
Our answer is that the prerequisites to the approval of the 
Jones applications were not affected by the protest of Lehi 
ltrigatio'n Company. It is usually, though not always, easier 
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to obtain judgment on default, but the prerequisites to judgment 
do not increase or diminish in ratio to the number of con-
testants or the intensity of opposition. An application for 
right to use water is addressed to the State of Utah, acting by 
its State Engineer, and is to be rejected or approved by him 
in response to the obligations devolving from act of the 
legisJature. As a practical matter, Lehi Irrigation Company 
may not have received it, but it and its rights would have been 
entitled to the same consideration had it not appeared before 
the Engineer, or, the applications having been brought before 
the Court, had it not been a party there. 
It is not uncommon that the State Engineer ·is the sole 
party, in form defendant, on appeal from his decision. Suppose 
the Jones applications had been denied without protest by or 
knowledge of them by Lehi Irrigation Company; that Jones 
had appealed, and, on the trial de novo before the District 
Court, the waters had been found to be and always to have 
been tributary to Dry Creek the entire flow of which Lehi 
Irrigation Company was entitled to use, and for those reasons 
the court had held the application properly denied. Would 
Jones be heard here--for long-to urge that a second party 
had improperly been brought into the case; or would he receive 
serious attention if he argued that the rights of the Irrigation 
Company had not been pleaded, and so must be ignored; or 
that the application ought to have been approved anyway, 
because approval is always ccsubject to prior rights"; and because 
"an application is not an appropriation"; and because .the State 
Engineer "has no judicial power" and the District Court on 
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appeal..f~om him cannot adjudicate water rights?!!! ··(Let 'em 
sue me.'' 
Here is another Straw Man (Jones Reply, page 10): 
CCThe brief erroneously assumes that the approval of 
these applications (subject to prior rights', will have some 
far reaching or destructive effect upon the whole plan of 
reclamation in the State. That water rights are thereby 
adjudicated or concluded." 
((The Brief" assumes none of that, and no one can reason-
ably assert that it does. Approval would confer the right to 
((take all steps required to apply the water to the use named 
in the application and to perfect the proposed appropriation." 
The statute (Section 10, Chapter 3, Title 100) says so. To 
acquire the right to do that is the very purpose and necessity 
of the application. The doing of that which would be author-
ized would prevent the water from reaching the place at which 
it is to be stored and measured. It would be inconsistent with 
and would C(impair existing rights" of the United States and 
the Provo River Water Users Association. Surely, we think, 
it is no sufficient or proper answer that they may have recourse 
to litigation. Aside from that, however, it is certain that the 
claim, or the fact, if it were such, that ((no one will be hurt" 
is not sufficient answer to the allegation that there has been 
a failure of proof. 
Here is another plea in abatement (Jones Reply, 
page 14): ((As further indicating the great number of 
questions that may be raised if the court were to attempt 
to litigate the alleged claims, as suggested by Amicus 
C . '' urtre ... 
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Who ever suggested that this court litigate. any claims! So 
far as the rights,of the Deer Creek Division of the Provo River 
Project are concerned, Respondent has already ''litigated" 
them in the sense of having established the fact of their 
existence. 
Another Straw (Jones Reply page 17): 
''Another matter of misconception in this connection 1s 
the reference to the language in the quoted statutes (A. 
10) as to 'unappropriated water in the proposed source.' 
(Jones' italics) From this, it is argued that the 'proposed 
source' here is Weber River.'' 
It is not so argued, either {(from this" or otherwise, and to 
assert that it is, is strangely unreasonable. 
And still another (Jones Reply, page 22): 
" ... it is confidently asserted that the United States does 
intend to reclaim this seepage, apparently directly. And, 
if this is true, then, of course, to reclaim it on the lands 
of every farmer where seepage may appear from increased 
irrigation.'' 
It is confidently asserted that the United States intends 
to reclaim this seepage. It is asserted with that degree of 
confidence naturally resulting from knowledge of a fact well 
known as such to everyone who knows anything of the Provo 
River Project. It is a fact of public notoriety. It is a fact 
known in more intimate relationship by the users of water from 
Utah Lake and their several counsel. It is, of course, not 
true, nor is it ccapparently" true that the seepage is to be 
reclaimed "directly" non the lands of every farmer ·where 
seepage may appear from increased irrigation." But even if 
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recovery of the seepage could not be accomplished except as 
Respondent says \ve say is intended, what of that? Practical dif-
ficulty of perfecting an appropriation is no ground for denial of 
the right to do so. Some of the cases cited by him are clear to 
that effect-the often cited Little Cottonwood Water Company 
vs. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, among others. 
We might go on and on with these, for there are many~ 
many more of the same sort; but time presses, and so we will 
close this part of our brief with statement of a curious fact. 
The Jones Reply purports to give several excerpts from our 
original brief, but few of them are entitled to quotation marks. 
Even quotation of the statute is not accurate in every instance. 
It is our hope that sufficient time will be available to permit 
a brief and analysis of all the cases cited by Respondents. 
Those, with a few in addition, we believe will include most, 
and perhaps all, of the decisions of this court defining the 
obligations of the State Engineer in relation to an application 
addressed to him ''for the purpose of acquiring the right to 
use a portion of the unappropriated water of the State of Utah." 
It occurs to us, however, that counsel, engrossed in their own 
business, too often forget that it is no more than a very small 
part of that imposed upon the court. Mindful of that tendency 
and the court's burden of many other cases, we shall re-state 
the essential facts and issues to which the decisions to be 
reviewed are applicable, and, although that may sufficiently 
appear from what has been said above, we shall also re-state 
the contentions of counsel for all parties and our own as 
. . 
amucts cunre. 
Three applications of Respondent Jones for right to use 
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unappropriated water were brought before the Fourth Judicial 
District Court by appeal from the decision of the State Engineer. 
Upon the trial de novo the actions were consolidated. The 
\Vaters involved were those uarising from springs and spring 
areas upon the lands" (Finding 5) of the applicant (tduring 
approximately the last three years." (Finding 7). · (The 
findings are dated January 30, 1948) . They would naturally 
drain into Dry Creek, a tributary of Utah Lake (Findings 4 
and 5 and the applications themselves) . They are waters 
((from increased flow in a spring and spring area: due to in-
creased seepage from an enlarged canal and extensive increased 
irrigation at higher levels from waters stored at Deer Creek 
Rservoir on the Provo River, and which. waters so used and so 
seeping and arising in defendant's land are substantially all 
waters diverted from the Weber River Irrigation System to 
the Provo River and to Deer Creek Reservoir." (Finding 6). 
To this we add the following from our original brief 
(pages 8 and 9): 
'(Those facts, supplemented and explained by some-
thing additional, are the basis of the conflicting claims 
of the parties. They have been enlarged upon by the 
supplying of a context in explanation of the expressions 
(tan enlarged canal," ((Deer Creek Reservoir," "waters 
diverted from Weber River System to the Provo River and 
to Deer Creek Reservoir.'' 
The result of the enlargement is such that the facts 
the effect of which is to be determined are these: 
Long before the appearance of the waters in question 
in the spring and spring area mentioned in Finding No. 
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6, the United States acting through its Bureau of Reclama-
tion had acquired the right to divert water from the 
Weber River system, transport it to the Provo River, store 
it in a reservoir constructed by the United States known 
as ((Deer Creek Reservoir," and distribute it from there 
for irrigation and domestic use upon lands and to com-
munities in Utah and Salt Lake counties. The project is 
popularly known as the ((Deer Creek Project." It is being 
constructed by the United States for the immediate benefit 
of and under contract with the Provo River Water Users 
Association. The project plan includes ((an enlarged 
canal," the enlargement of the Provo Reservoir Canal, and 
the distribution through it of a part of the project water 
brought from the Weber River and stored in the reservoir 
on the Provo. 
The rights of the United States have been exercised, 
and that part of the project plan just mentioned has been 
carried out; it has diverted water from the Weber River 
system, has transported it to the Provo River, has stored 
it in Deer Creek Reservoir, has enlarged the Provo 
Reservoir Canal and through it has distributed a part of 
the stored water upon lands at higher levels than the lands 
of Respondent Jones. It is as the result of all this that 
the waters sought to be appropriated by Jones have accrued 
to the ((spring and spring area" mentioned in the finding. 
If the context of the expressions of Finding No. 6 
were of decisive import under pleadings essential to the 
cause, it might be said that, aside from facts proper to 
be judicially noticed, it had not been supplied. But there 
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is no issue of that nature. Instead it is plain from the 
record as well as from the briefs of counsel that references 
to and discussion of the Deer Creek Project, the Deer 
Creek Reservoir, the Project water rights (except as to 
one matter of interpretation) and the Reclamation project 
generally of which they are all a part were taken by 
counsel and by the trial court as matter of course, as 
requiring no proof, as within the knowledge and under-
standing of all concerned. It is our opinion that the 
Provo River Project of the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation-both the Deer Creek and Aqueduct Divi-
sions-its principal physical features, its scope, its basic 
outline and plan-is judicially known. But in the brief 
statement of fact above we need not rely upon that ____ but 
we take it that we may rely upon the context of facts found 
to be such, at least to the extent it has been supplied by 
both court and counsel." 
Every other statement made by us has been the object of 
critical comment either in the C(Reply of State Engineer to 
Brief of Amicus Curire" or in C(Reply of Respondent Jones 
To Amicus Curire Brief," but that just quoted is not questioned. 
On the contrary, the Reply said to be that of the State Engineer 
assumes the facts to be as we now and originally stated them, 
while that of Respondent Jones questioning at length (pages 
18-21) our stand that the nDeer Creek Project" is Judicially 
known, as well as everything else, makes no mention of this. 
Those, then, are the facts, settled and agreed upon as effectually 
as upon an agreed statement. 
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Our conclusions from the facts was originally (pages 12-
13) and is now stated in the following language: 
ttNow it seems clear to us that Respondent, so far 
from having sustained the burden of showing any facti 
in response to which he may nacquire the right to the use 
of any una ppropriateed public water in this state,'' and 
that ttthere is unappropriated water in the proposed 
source,'' has established the very opposite, that th~re is 
none. Appellant alleged that there was no ((unappro-
priated water in the proposed source" because it had 
already been appropriated by Lehi Irrigation Company, 
and Respondent, in order to disprove this, established 
that there was no ttunappropriated water in the proposed 
source" because, not Lehi Irrigation Company, but the 
United States had already appropriated the waters the 
subject of the application for the benefit of the Deer Creek 
Division of the Provo River Project." 
Respondents answer this and the conclusion of the same 
effect urged by Appellant, by calling attention to the fact (and 
it is) that Appellant did not so much as mention the Provo 
River Water Users' Association or the United States in the 
<(Complaint and Application for Review" by which the pro-
priety of granting or rejecting the Applications was brought 
for trial de novo before the Fourth District Court. The issue, 
and the only issue, to be decided at that trial, he contends, was 
that made by the claim of Lehi Irrigation Company that the 
waters the subject of the Applications had been appropriated 
by it. The effect of regarding any rights of Provo River Water 
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Users' Association, he urges, is to interject a third party into 
a private controversy between Jones on one side and Lehi 
Irrigation Company on the other. That is to say, as Re-
spondents' original and Reply briefs so often do, uthis is a 
private law suit between two small water users" and is of no 
concern to any one else. Also, even if the United States and the 
Provo River Water Users' Association have prior rights to the 
use of the water in question, the application should never-
theless be approved because all approvals are expressly subject 
to prior rights, and, in any event, an application is not an 
appropriation, and its its approval cannot be inconsistent with 
existing rights. The result of it may be, but in such case recourse 
may be had to the courts. Again, the waters were going to 
waste, anyway, and so were open to appropriation. 
And still again, in order to give effect to any rights the 
United States may have would require an adjudication of 
\vater rights, and the State Engineer having no judicial powers 
may not accomplish that. Finally, the showing of the rights of 
the United States to the use of the waters in question is not 
inconsistent with approval of the applications because, whether 
those rights derive from its approved Weber River applications 
or from its approved Application No. 12144, they are both 
no more than applications, and an application isn't an appro~ 
priation. The result is that the establishment of those rights 
does not establish that there is no ··unappropriated water in 
the proposed source~ 
Those two paragraphs state, we think, every single conten-
tion made by Respondents, and we believe they state each of 
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them as fully and fairly and as clearly as they have been by 
Respondents themselves. All of them have been answered in 
our original brief and have been and will be again in this. 
The contention that this is a private controversy, limited 
in its scope to determinations of the relative rights of the appli-
cant and the person who brought the application before the Dis-
trict court, and hence that the interests and rights of no others 
may be considered, is something which, in view of the statute and 
the nature of the proceeding, we are compelled to regard as 
utterly and obviously frivolous, and, in a sense, unworthy. 
So also is that which seeks to exclude consideration of the 
rights of others on the ground that to do so involves a judicial 
determination of those rights. It might as well (or as ill) be 
argued that for such reason, no regard can properly be given 
to the rights of the person who brought the Application before 
the court, or for that matter, who has appeared before the State 
Engineer. As to an approval being subject to prior rights, 
that is merely in accentuation of the fact that, while the 
Engineer is expressly charged with the duty to make a determi-
nation, his determination is not final in the sense that one actu-
ally injured by it may not bring it in question by appropriate 
action in -the courts. As to an applications not being an appro-
priation: neither is a Certificate of Appropriation or a Decree. 
All of them, however, authorize an appropriation. As to the 
waters running to waste: it might as well be said that all waters 
up stream from points of diversi~n . or storage are running to 
waste. 
We have noticed before, and shall probably again call 
attention to the fact that the major, almost the entire, effort 
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of Respondents is directed to an avoidance of a decision on 
the merits-not a final decision on the tnerits of any vested or 
claimed to be vested water rights, but a decision as to merit of 
our contention that Respondent Jones has made no case for 
the approval of his applications; that, so far from satisfying 
the requirements of Section 8 of Chapter 3 of Title 100 Utah 
Code Annotated, he has established affirmatively that those 
requirements have not been satisfied. 
Now, however, we shall brief and analyze the cases cited 
by Respondents and seek to determine, as best we can, their 
application to the facts, as well as to the several results 
claimed by Respondents to follow from them. 
Sowards vs. Meagher, 37 Utah 212 
"The appellants, plaintiffs below, filed an application with 
the state engineer for the appropriation of waters of the East 
fork of Lake fork of Green river. By reason of such application, 
they claim to have initiated a right to the use of three hundred 
second feet of water of such stream for irrigation purposes. 
Upon a protest filed for the respondents, the defendants below, 
who also filed applications for an appropriation of the same 
waters, plaintiffs' application was rejected and the respondents' 
approved by the state engineer. The plaintiffs then brought 
this action in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
against the defe,ndants to adjudicate the questions involved." 
The application of Plaintiff appellants were filed with the 
State Engineer subsequent to those of Defendant Respondents. 
They were ((rejected by the state engineer on the sole ground 
that their application is in conflict U'ith prior applications'' of 
Defendant Respondents. 
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Appellant contended that their application, though filed 
after those of Respondents, ought not to have been rejected, 
because '' all of said water applied for" by Respondents "and 
the lands proposed to be irrigated'' by them were within an 
Indian Reservation not yet open to entry when their applications 
were filed, and so that the State of Utah had no jurisdiction over 
the waters or the lands, and hence the applications were void. 
It was held by this court "that unappropriated public water 
on a reservation or on the public domain is subject to appro-
priation, and may be appropriated for a beneficial purpose, 
though the appropriator has not, when his application is filed 
with the state engineer,' a present right in or to the lands along · 
the stream from which the water is proposed to be diverted, or 
in or to the lands proposed to be irrigated by him.'' 
The opinion precedes this by several pages and follov{s it 
with seven; but the paragraph just quoted is all that was de-
cided. 
This case is cited by the Special Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral as follows: (Reply page 6) "In Sowards vs. Meagher 
the Court held that an application to appropriate was 
nothing more than a "preliminary notice of intent." Some-
thing like that was ''said,'' but it was not ''held.'' A great deal 
else was also said, including reference to "the appropriation 
was applied for," "the application was made to appropriate," 
etc., etc. So much was. said that, fifteen years later, the writer 
of the opinion cited the case as authority opposed to the decision 
of this court in Deseret Livestock Company vs. Hoopiania, 
66 Utah 25. But the facts and decision of Sowards vs. 
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1'1eagher are as \Ve have given them above and as better ex-
pressed by Justice Thurman, pages 45-6 of 25 Utah. 
But in any event, this case neither decides nor says anything 
concerning the prerequisites to the approval of an application. 
It is, however, a case in which an application was nrejected by 
the state engineer on the sole groundn that it was rr in conflict 
U'ith prior applications.,') 
Counsel follows immediately with this: ((The State En-
gineer should examine the application to ascertain the declared 
intent, and if there is reasonable probability to believe that a 
right must be perfected, the State Engineer has been told by 
this Court that he should approve the application.'' 
Where and when has this Court told the State Engineer 
that or anything like that? It is an almos.t necessary inference 
that Counsel asserts it to have been in Sowards vs. Meagher 
on January 22, 1910. The fault with the statement is that it 
omits all context-((reasonably probability'' in view of what? 
From what counsel says, one might judge that the matter is to 
be determined from an examination of the application. 
Yates vs. Newton, 59 Utah 105 
The waters of Pole Canyon, including certain tributary 
springs had been appropriated long prior to the application 
before the court, but ((It appears that the gorge or ravine lead-
ing from this canyon is gravelly and that after June 15th, or 
thereabouts, the waters which run from the springs are not suffi-
cient in volume to reach the mouth of the canyon, but sink into 
the sand and disappear. It evidently was the intention of the 
engineer, who is an experienced and capable man in h1s pro-
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fession, that possibly by the expenditure of money and the 
gathering together of the waters of this canyon they could be 
prevented from sinking or disappearing into the ground and 
thereby be put in a beneficial use both in irrigation and in the 
production of power. It is quite evident that it was not the 
intention of the engineer to in any way disturb the rights of 
respondents to the use of the waters as they have been used 
for many years. If such were the intent, it was clearly beyond 
his power or authority to grant such right." 
In relation to the duty of the State Engineer, the Court 
said, ((It is only in the event that the engineer finds unappro-
priated water that applicants inay obtain rights to the use of 
water in this state.'' But here, as the court found, there was 
unappropriated water. It was that which sank into the sand 
and disappeared ((after June 15th, or thereabouts." The court 
was of opinion, based on the record, that effort to save it t<must 
ultimately prove a failure," but there was no occasion to pre-
vent the attempt. The case was remanded with direction to 
the District Court to retain jurisdiction to make such order as 
might be necessary if it appeared that the effort to save the 
lost water did interfere with the rights of the prior appropriator. 
This last was proper under the facts, but we think it would have 
been still more appropriate to have limited the approval to the 
non-irrigation season. 
We cannot agree with the Court's theory of the facts, for 
it seems clear that the sands and gravels into which the spring 
waters disappeared were not lost, but went to fill the under-
ground reservoir contributory to the prior appropriator's stream, 
and that if withdrawn they would necessarily have to be made 
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up next season. \X' e should have concluded, therefore, that the 
nlosf' \Vaters had been appropriated. One might as well apply 
for the right to use \Vaters which might be ttsaved" by driving a 
tunnel into the canyon \valls of Big Cottonwood and of saving 
from loss that which is stored there but which does not reach 
points of diversion during late summer and all winte~ months. 
Ho\vever, as the facts were made to appear, the decision is the 
same in principle as that of Little Cottonwood Water Company 
vs. Kimball, 76 Utah, where the unappropriated water was that 
lost in carriage through an open ditch. 
The case is cited (page 6) to this: t]n Yates vs. New-
ton . . . the Court said that no order of the State Engineer 
can disturb vested rights in water." The Court did say that, 
but, though the Engineer cannot disturb the rights, the frequent 
necessity of saying so evinces clearly enough that he can and 
often does ((disturb" their owners. That fact and the fact that 
rights may be interfered with and affected is one of the several 
reasons for the provisions of Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 100 of 
the code. 
Robinson vs. Schoenfeld, 62 Utah 233 
Plaintiff, who had made no application to the State En-
gineer since 1903, and who had made no appropriation before 
that date, brought an action to prevent interference with their 
using springs by a person who had made applications, then in 
good standing, for the right to use their waters. It was held 
that ttthe fact that defendant had filed his applications, and 
that those filings were in good standing could be offered in 
evidence in defense against the claim for an jn junction against 
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defendant to restrain him from in any way interfering with the 
waters of the springs." 
The Court said (( * * * the filing of an application in the 
State Engineer's office" does not ((in and of itself amount to 
an appropriation of water. It at most gives to the applicant a 
right to complete the appropriations." 
This case is cited (page 7) to the following: ((The Utah 
court has, time and again, said that an application to ap-
propriate is not a completed appropriation." Robinson vs. 
Schoenfeld doesn't decide that, true as it is; but one might 
answer: who ever thought that an application to appropriate 
is a completed appropriation? The statute expressly states, 
however, that when approved it confers the right to complete 
an appropriation. An application to appropriate is not a com-
pleted appropriation and neither is a Certificate of Appropria-
tion, nor is a ((Decreed Right."· All, however, within varying 
limits, give or attest the right to appropriate. 
This is something to which we shall return when we dis-
cuss the invalidity of Respondents' contention that the existence 
of rights of the United States and Provo River Water Users 
Association, being founded on approved applications, which 
when exercised exhaust the proposed source, are not inconsistent 
with there still being ccunappropriated" in that source, because 
((an application to appropriate is not a completed appropria-
tion." It's a queer state of mind, indeed, that will permit the 
use of inexact and careless expressions as the basis of a con-
elusion meticulously pedantic, ·as well as one opposite to the 
physical facts. 
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Deseret Livestock Company vs. Hoopiania, 66 Utah 25 
The facts and decision of the court as to the procedtire 
necessary to the acquisition of a water right sufficiently appear 
from the following from the opinion of Chief Justice Gidion: 
''\V e are of the opinion, and so hold, that the Legislature 
of Utah, by the act of 1903, intended to limit the method of 
acquiring any rights to the unappropriated public waters of 
the state to the method or means prescribed in that act. The 
rights attempted to be acquired by respondent Hoopiania by 
actually diverting the water and applying the same to a bene-
ficial use must therefore be held to be subject to the right of 
appellant who will acquire the first right by completing its 
appropriation initiated by its application filed in the state en-
gineer's office on April 25, 1918." The court held the statute 
to mean just what it said. 
This case is cited to the effect that ((an application to ap-
propriate is not an appropriation," etc., followed by this: 
rry he1'efore, so long as there are only applications on a stream, 
all of the waters thereof are unappropriated and new applica-
tions ought not to be rejected. It is not anticipated that this 
principle of law will be seriously controverted." It won't be, 
or at least it won't be ((seriously," for it can't well be seriously 
considered. 
To say that ((an application to appropriate is not an appro-
priation" is to state a fact of the same quality as to state that 
"an application for employment is not an employment," which 
is fairly obvious. An approved application is not an appropri-
ation either, but approval confers the right to appropriate, and 
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must be founded on a finding that there "is unappropriated 
water in the proposed source" and that ((the proposed use \vill 
not impair existing rights." Nothing in that sentence is the 
result of any reasoning process; the first part is axiomatic and 
the last two parts are statements of the statute - Chapter 3, 
Title 100. Now the Attorney General follows that ''an appli-
cation to appropriate is not an appropriation" with "There 
is no appropriation of water until a Certificate of Appropriation 
issues" and then goes on with the "therefore} so long as there 
are only applications on a stream all of the waters thereof are 
unappropriated and new applications ought not to be rejected." 
What is the use of saying that "there is no appropriation of 
water until a Certificate of Appropriation issues" when every 
one knows that approval of an application authorizes an appro-
priation, and that no Certificate will issue until an appropriation 
has been made and proved as required by Section 16 ? What 
is meant, we suppose or, as we are impelled to believe, what 
Respondent ought to have meant is something as easily said; 
that, as between an applicant and the State of Utah, approval 
by it of an application confers the right to appropriate, but it 
confers no right which may not be terminated by failure to do 
within time what has been authorized. 
Falkenberg vs. Neff, 72 Utah 258 
Action for damages for wrongful destruction of a dam 
and diverting works. 
Both Appellants and Respondents had uuncompleted ap-
plications for appropriations for irrigation purposes of definite 
quantities of water therein pending before the State Engineer." 
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Appellants' \Yas prior tn time. Both had been approved. 
nNeither ... had been perfected." Respondents ((constructed 
a diverting dam across the creek to a point above the Appellants· 
proposed point of diversion and thereafter diverted a quantity 
of '''ater from the stream through a flume, and were using it 
to aid in the construction of a ditch.'' Appellants destroyed 
the dam. At the time they had ttconstructed no diverting works 
in the stream, and had no ability to make, and had made no 
diversion or use of any of the water flowing therein.'' 
Appellants sought to justify their action on the ground 
that their approved application for 30 cubic feet· per second of 
water, being prior to that of respondents, entitled them to the 
uninterrupted flow at that rate to their proposed point of di-
version, even though they had no present use for it. 
The lower court charged the jury that if they nfound that 
Respondents' dam and diversion of the water in no way lessened 
the supply of the water which Appellants could and would then 
use, Appellants had no right to interfere with or remove the 
Respondents' dam." 
Held that the charge was unobjectionable. 
This case is cited Page 8-9 of the Attorney General's reply. 
·'There is another factor which indicates that the waters in 
question are unappropriated. The Supreme Court said in Falk-
enberg vs. Neff . . . that where the plain_tiff and defendant 
both held approved applications and the defendant's was prior 
in time, the defendant had no right to complain of the diversion 
of water by the plaintiff if the defendant was not then in a 
position to use it. That at such times as an appropriator is not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
using the water . . . it is subject to appropriation and use by 
others." This is amplified on the same pages, and that follow-
ing, where it is said, "whether or not the Provo River Water 
Users Association can later reassert the right to capture this 
water is foreign to this law suit." 
Now we ask, with all respect possible under the circum-
stances, how can Falkenberg vs. Neff and that comment be 
th<;>ught to be applicable here? It all appears under the heading: 
"Waters Running to Waste are Unappropriated Waters." No 
one, so far as we know, questions it. Suppose that in Falken-
berg vs. Neff the Appellants' dam and diverting works had 
been completed and their irrigation project was in operation, 
and that then Respondents had constructed a tight dam above, 
with such effect that the 30 second feet to which Appellants 
were entitled wouldn't reach their dam.· If those had been the 
facts, and the court had still decided against Appellants, the 
case could have been properly cited here. And suppose in such 
case that Respon~ents had sought to justify their withholding 
above on the ground that the waters appeared to be going to 
waste ... ((they were just running down stream." Surely they 
were running down stream; were running and, except for their 
diversion above, would have run into Appellants' reservoir. 
It would be idle, and worse, in such case, to talk of waters 
running to waste; and so is it here. The Deer Creek Division 
of the Provo River Project cannot be likened to the irrigation 
project of Appellants in Falkenberg vs. Neff. The United 
States, under its Weber River applications, has long since 
appropriated water from that river and has transported it to 
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the Provo, has stored it in the Deer Creek Reservoir, has dis-
tributed it on lands under the project and, unless interfered 
'vith by diversions inconsistent, it will recapture and restore 
and reuse it again. All this was established by Respondent Jones 
in response to his successful effort to show that Lehi Irrigation 
Company had no right to the use of the waters sought to be 
appropriated by him. No question is made of this; but it is said 
to be all irrelevant and immaterial; that the rights of Provo 
RiYer Water Users Association are ((entirely foreign to this 
la\\. suit." 
"Foreign to this law suit" because (pages 9-10) ((This 
case \vas presented to the State Engineer as a private dispute 
between an irrigation company and a landowner on whose 
lands waters arise by seepage. Each claimed a superior right 
to use the water. At the time of dispute the waters were 
running to waste. The State Engineer, by approving the 
application, simply intended to settle the imn1ediate dispute 
between those two users and to recognize in Jones a superior 
right of use because he had filed on it, and Lehi Irrigation 
Company had not. The approval order was expressly made 
(subject to prior rights.' Certainly, under the cases cited next 
above, there was a sufficient showing to justify the approval 
of the application." 
((The cases cited above" are Falkenberg vs. Neff and 
Adams vs. Portage Irrigation Reservoir & Power Company 
95 Utah 1. Mention of the latter (except as limited on 
rehearing) is something we regard as approaching the indeli-
cate. It is cited (Cto the same effect" as Falkenberg vs. Neff. 
It isn't at all, as anyone who can read it through ought to 
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perceive with less than "half an eye." But the Attorney General 
seems to like it, especially the l(air and the winds and the 
sunshine'' part which he appropriat~s to his own use on 
page 13. 
Returning to the paragraph of quotation next but one 
above. If that and the many other expressions of identical 
effect from both Respondents are accurate as to \vhat the 
State Engineer actually did, and it is what he ought to have 
done--then we are as wrong as can be, and our labor in this 
matter is all for nothing, because, in that event, it has been 
occasioned by a complete misapprehension of the duties of 
the State Engineer as fixed by the legislature and the decisions 
of this court. But if we are not mistaken-if the obligation of 
the Engineer is as we have defined at pages 9-10 & 16-17 above, 
and as this court has defined it in Eardley vs. Terry, then 
we urge that this case be remanded regardless of the 
rzghts of the Provo River Water Users Association-that is 
to say, without consideration of them or their legal effect. 
We urge this, in that event, because the trial court did pre-
cisely as Respondents say the State Engineer did and ought 
to have done. (See Finding of Fact No. 7). And what is 
that! It is the regard and consideration of the case entirely 
as a private dispute with no consideration or regard whatever 
of the statute. What each-the trial court and the Engineer 
-((intended to settle" and so all that either did settle was 
((the immediate dispute between those two users and to 
recognize in Jones a superior right of use because he had filed 
on it, and Lehi Irrigation Company had not,'' as though the 
case had been that presented by Robinson vs. Schoenfeld. 
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As Counsel for Provo River Water Users Association, 
and as Amicus Curire also, \ve feel that the case should be 
remanded with direction to reject the Jones application, but, 
as Amicus Curire alone, we suggest that it be remanded in 
any event, so that, at least, there shall be some approach to 
compliance with the real essense of the law. As it is, all 
that was done or attempted to be done is what is reflected in 
Finding No. 7 . 
.. The waters thus and here involved have ar1sen during 
approximately the last three years, and the appropriation and 
use of these will not diminish plaintiff's supply of water under 
its appropriations, and will not impair any existing rights of 
plaintiff.-·-· 
((That's all there is; there isn't any more." 
Little Cottonwood Water Company vs. Kimball, 76 Utah 
243. 
Kimball made application for right to appropriate 10 
cubic feet of water per second, proposed to be saved by deliver-
ing through a pipe line water diverted from the creek and 
delivered to places of use by means of an open ditch from 
which the amount of the proposed savings was lost by 
evaporation and seepage. 
The court held the savings to be subject to appropriation, and 
hence that it had not been shown that there was no unappropri-
ated water in the proposed source. It held also that practical 
difficulf'res1n the way of effecting the proposed savings had 
nothing to do with the propriety of granting an application 
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for right to appropriate it. ''The inquiry on this branch of 
the case ends when, from the facts found, it cannot be said 
that there is no unappropriated water in the proposed source." 
That is what this case decides. Chief Justice Cherry said 
that the application ought to be approved, anyway, because 
of the existence of some flood waters. But they were not the 
subject of Kimball's application. 
This case is cited by the Attorney General (pages 5, 6 
and 7) to the effect that ccthe State Engineer has no judicial 
power, and he must not attempt to decide judicial questions 
or determine vested rights except in a very general way" and 
"It is only where there is no probability that the application 
might be perfected that the State Engineer should deny the 
application," and, ''The Utah Court has, time and again, said 
that an application to appropriate is not a completed appro-
priation." 
We have no fault to find with any of this except ((It is 
only where there is no probability that the application might 
be perfected that the State Engineer should deny the appli-
cation." We suppose this was intended to read, "It is only 
when there is no probability that the appropriation might be 
perfected" etc. But even so, it is an inaccurate statement. 
This court may have said something like that. In fact, 
unappropriated water having been found, this court in Yates 
vs. Newton held that the application ought not to be rejected 
even though it appeared that the effort ((must prove a failure." 
There also, what was involved was a "Savings Filing." It 
is only in relation to such a situation that the language objected 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
to is relevant without addition. It cannot be properly applied 
in the first instance to the situation presented by Section 8, 
Chapter 3, Title 100, where the Engineer is authorized to 
approve only HIF": tt ( 1) There is unappropriated water in 
the proposed source; (2) The proposed use \vill not impair 
existing rights or interfere with the more beneficial use of 
the water.'' 
As to the other language quoted and said to have been 
the .. holding" of the court in Little Cottonwood Water 
Company vs. Kimball; the fault found is not necessarily that 
it was unnecessary to the decision, if it was, but that it is 
taken out of a context with which it may have been in accord 
and is used as the basis of faulty reasoning. The Engineer 
has no judicial powers; therefore he has no powers. ((An 
application is not an appropriation. It is but a preliminary 
notice of intention. There is no appropriation of vvater until 
a Certificate of Appropriation issues. Therefore, so long 
as there are only applications on a stream, all the waters thereof 
are unappropriated, and therefore, new applications ought 
not to be rejected." 
One should not expect to find decisions on this, for it is 
something which cannot be ((seriously" considered. It was 
implicit, however, in the decision of Sowards vs. ·Meagher, 
where one application was ((rejected by the State Engineer 
on the sole ground" that it was (tin conflict with prior appli-
cations." It was also implicit in the decision in Tanner vs. 
Bacon, State Engineer. In both cases the interference and con-
sequent rejection of the interfering application was with an 
application under which the authorized appropriation had 
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not yet been made. Here the waters in question have been 
found to be the result of appropriations already made of 
waters from the Weber River, impounded in and used from 
the Deer Creek Reservoir by means of the Provo Reservoir 
Canal enlargement. Will anyone contend that those waters 
have not been appropriated? 
This court ( (knows,'' or if it doesn't, it cannot but realize 
that it must be, that holders of approved applications often 
appropriate and use U'ater continuously, often for years, before 
a Certificate of Appropriation issues. It's common practice. 
It is true under the Provo River Project, and it is and has been 
true as to literally thousands of other appropriators in similar 
situation. 
The briefs of Respondents, and especially the Reply brief 
of the Attorney General, have been largely composed by a 
stringing together of isolated sentences or unauthorized ver-
sions of sentences from the opinions of this court and ·by 
adding to them conclusions which do not logically follow. 
It is possibly impolitic to say it, but we cannot help being 
reminded of what Mr. Justice Thurman said and did in 
Stookey vs. Green, 53 Utah 311. ((We appreciate the im-
portance of every decision of this court relating to the 
subject of irrigation and water rights, especially when we 
realize that even fugitive suggestions outside the issues of 
the case, as well as expressions applicable to the facts, may 
be erroneously referred to and relied on in subsequent cases." 
This, after reviewing and stating the effect of half a dozen 
or so former Utah water cases, and strongly intimating that if 
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certain facts not before the court were before it, its decision 
\vould be so and so. The result has been that Stookey vs. 
Green, \vhich really decides nothing, has been cited as often, 
perhaps, as any water case, and as authority for almost any-
thing. 
Clark vs. North Cottonwood Irrigation & Water Co. 
79 Utah 425. 
This is another ((the court said" case. It is otherwise of 
no possible relevancy here. ((The court said that it is quite 
generally held that one may not acquire a perfected right to 
have seepage water kept up, but when seepage water finds its 
way back to the natural stream from which it originally came, 
such water may be appropriated again. All the parties to 
this litigation, the court said, proceeded well they rp.ight upon 
the theory that the seepage water in controversy was subject 
to appropriation." 
Neither of the subjects of the court's statement were in 
issue, but the court did say something like that, but not quite 
that. It said ((permanent" right, not ((perfected" right. If 
we were not in agreement with what the court said, we might 
cite what the court said in Stookey vs. Green in regard to 
Garns vs. Rollins 41 Utah · 260 and Roberts vs. Gribble 43 
Utah 511. ((The principle underlying these cases seems to 
be that waste and seepage waters from artificial irrigation 
constitute an artificial, rather than natural, source of supply, 
and therefore are not subject to appropriation." But we don't 
cite them to that point because we think they decide no more 
than that the appropriator of seepage from irrigation above 
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cannot require its continuance. 
Again we might well distinguish, for here there is no 
"seepage \vater" that C(fi.nds its way. back to the natural strearn 
jro1n which it originally came." The seepage water in question 
here was appropriated and brought from a foreign water shed 
for the benefit of a great reclamation project to which it is 
essential. .There is thus presented a state of facts very different 
from that in Respondent's ((the court said." More appropriate 
we suggest is what the Supreme court of the United States and 
the Federal. Court said and decided in Ide vs. United States, 
263 U. S. 497, and in United States vs. Haga, 276 Fed. 41: 
I(In point of law the general principle upon which 
the plaintiff relies is scarcely open to controversy; 
one "\\rho by the expenditure of money and labor diverts 
appropriable water fron1 a stream, and thus makes it 
available for fruitful purposes, is entitled to its exclu-
sive control so lortg as he is able to willing to apply 
it to beneficial uses, and such right extends to what is 
commonly known as wastage fron1 surface run-off and 
deep percolation, necessarily incident to practical 
irrigation. Considerations of both public policy and 
natural justice strongly support such a rule. Nor is 
it essential to his control that the appropriator maintain 
continuous actual possession of such water. So long 
as he does not abandon it or forfeit it by failure to 
use, he may assert his rights. It is not necessary that 
he confine it upon his own land or convey it in an 
artificial conduit. It is requisite, of course, that he 
be able to identify it; but, subject to that limitation, 
he may conduct it through natural channels and may 
even commingle it or suffer it to commingle with 
other waters. In short', the rights of an appropriator 
in these respects are not affected by the fact that the 
water has once been used." 
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We might go even further and cite Clark vs. North 
Cottonwood Irrigation & Water Company ourselves, claiming 
that the following indicates (as it well may) that ~ven seepag~ 
\Vater finding Hits way back to the natural stream from which 
it originally came" may not be appropriated unless it be sho\vn 
that the original appropriator has abandoned. We quote 
from page 437 of 79 Utah: 
··There is no pleading, finding, or proof that defendant 
abandoned its claim to the right _to use the water (seepage 
and return flow, it was) which finds its way into North 
Cottonwood Creek ... " 
.. What we do decide is that the evidence in this case fails 
to show that defendant has lost its right to regulate, control, 
and distribute to its stockholders the water which finds its 
way into the North Cottonwood Creek above the old intake 
of the Richards-Spackman-Van Fleet ditch." 
Tanner vs. Humphries, State Engineer, 87 Utah 164. 
This case has to do with the duty of the State Engineer 
and, on appeal from his decision, that if the trial court, on appli-
cation for change of place of diversion. So far as at all helpful 
here, the court held that n. • • the burden rests upon plaintiff 
(the applicant) to establish the necessary facts to make out a 
Prima Facie case" and that on motion for nonsuit (<testimony to 
the effect that the diversion would not affect the character of the 
water in the flume a~d that it would not impair any rights of 
the Power Company was sufficient ... '' 
This case is not cited by Respondents. We are in perfect 
accord with what the court said as necessarily following from 
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arid incident to the decision as quoted, that C(lt would be im-
practicable to require the plaintiff (applicant) to ferret out 
all the ways in which the others might perchance be injured 
and offer proof in negation thereof as a part of its affirmative 
case." In the case of Lehi Irrigation Company vs. Jones, 
however, the applicant's negation of injury to one water user 
affirmed it as to another. In no case we have seen has there 
been a similar state of facts. 
Eardley vs. Terry, 94 Utah 367. 
Application was made to appropriate ''Y2 cubic foot per 
second of the alleged unappropriated waters of a creek . . ." 
The water sought to be appropriated was that saved from loss 
by trenching a wash. The trenching had been accomplished 
before the filing of the application, and the only testimony 
offered was that ((the natural flow of the stream was increased 
1;2 second foot'' and therefore that there was unappropriated 
water in the proposed source. 
It was "apparent from the pleadings, the evidence and 
the decree entered by the trial court that the proceedings 
before the court were considered as involving the litigation 
of the respective rights of the parties to tbe water of Beaver 
Datn wash and a final determination of such rights and their 
nature and extent. The Respondent was not only granted a 
reinstatement of his application to appropriate water and the 
right to continue thereunder by the decree, but he was like-
wise given a present grant of all the water developed as 
conserved by him." 
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For this reason it was necessary to remand the case for 
correction of the decree as to the present grant, to state \vhy, 
and thus to define the duties of the State Engineer and, on 
appeal from him, the nature and scope of those of the trial 
court. 
Hit should be remembered that the proceeding 1n the 
district court \Yas by way of appeal from the decision of the 
state engineer rejecting respondent's application to appro-
priate water. Under the statute, section 100-3-8, R. S. Utah 
1933, when an application is filed the state engineer is required 
to determine whether there this unappropriated water in the 
proposed source of supply and whether the water sought to 
be appropriated can be put to a benefical use and can be 
diverted from the source of supply without doing· material 
injury to the prior rights of others. While the statute, R. S. 
1933, 100-3-7, also provides for the filing of protests to any 
application to appropriate water, this does not enlarge the 
scope of the proceedings before the state engineer beyond 
the determination of the question above stated. The state 
engineer is required to determine whether the application 
should be rejected or approved by a consideration of the ele-
ments above stated. He does not, and has no authority in 
such p~oceeding to, fix and determine the rights of the parties 
to the proceeding. He simply determines whether there is 
unappropriated water which can be beneficially used without 
injury to or conflict with prior rights. If the application is 
approved, the applicant must thereafter construct his works, 
make beneficial use, and, by actual use of the water, fix the 
nature and limits of the rights which can be claimed and. 
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granted under the application. The approval or rejection 
of the application is simply a preliminary matter and is not 
intended to, and does not, fix the rights of the parties before 
the state engineer in such proceeding. When an appeal is 
taken from the decision of the state engineer· in such a case, 
the trial court is required to determine the same questions de 
novo. It determines whether the application should be ap-
proved or rejected and does not fix the rights of the parties 
beyond the determination of that matter. The issues remain 
the same upon an appeal to this court. All that the district 
court or this court, on appeal from the district court, is called 
upon to do is to determine whether the application should be 
rejected or approved. If it appears that there is unappropriated 
water which the applicant seeks to appropriate and which he 
can beneficially use without injury to or conflict with the prior 
rights of others, then the application should be approved 
by the court; otherwise, it should be rejected. If the applica-
tion is approved, then the applicant must proceed to perfect 
his appropriation as provided by law and make proof thereof 
under Section 100-3-16 R. S. 1933. Until it is so perfected, 
he cannot be decreed or given present rights as under a com-
pleted appropriation. It may be that, although the application 
is approved,· the applicant may not be able to perfect his 
appropriation.'' 
tcit seems clear to us that the Legislature intended that 
when the application is filed, the state engineer is called upon 
to determine preliminary whether there is probable cause to 
believe that an application can be perfected, having due 
regard to whether the1"e is unappropriated wate,- available 
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for appropriation, u'hether it can be put to a beneficial use, 
"nd u'hethe-r it can be direrted and so used without injuring 
or conflicting U'ith the prior rights of others. If he determines 
there is such probability, the application is approved and the 
applicant then proceeds to detnonstrate by an, actual use of 
the rights sought to be acquired that he is entitled to such 
rights." 
"The District Court should simply determine whether 
the application was rightly rejected. In determining that 
question, the court stands in th·e same position as the state 
engineer did. It must determine from the evidence whether 
there is probable cause to be~ieve that there is unappropriated 
water available or water which can be made available for use; 
that the applicant can beneficially use such unappropriated 
water; and that such water can be diverted from the source 
of supply and used without injury to or conflict with prior 
rights." 
This case is cited by Respondent Jones and by the Attorney 
General on at least four separate occasions~ 
First to this: (original Respondents, page 5) ((The courts 
below and here can. only determine whether the State 
Engineer rightly approved the application, as against the pro-
test of an Appellant, and will sustain him where he does not 
act 'arbitrarily or capriciously.' " To this also cited Tanner 
vs. Bacon, 103 Utah 494. Neither of these cases gives coun-
tenance to what is thus claimed for them; nor does any other 
Utah case. The trial in the District Court is de novo. The 
statute directs that it shall be and Eardly vs. Terry says that 
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it must be. ((It is the duty of the court to try the case de novo." 
There is no question of sustaining the Engineer. The ((arbi-
trarily or capriciously'' used by counsel is picked out of this, 
from Tanner vs. Bacon, ((This decision (of the District Court) 
not being arbitrary or capricious but based upon experience, 
and well recognized principles must be sustained." 
Next (Reply of Attorney General, page 5) (( ... the 
issues are limited to those which confronted the State Engineer 
in the approval or rejection of an application." If by this is 
meant that rejection or approval of this application is before 
the Engineer and, on appeal, before the District Court, it is 
correct, Eardley vs. Terry says so. But if what is meant is 
that if the Engineer did not notice or give regard to all the 
facts, the court may not, it is quite obviously wrong. 
Again (page 6) (( ... In Eardley vs. Terry the court said 
no final rights are acquired until proof of appropriation." 
Well, what of it? 
It may be that Eardley vs. Terry is cited elsewhere, but 
there is no use in pursuing further the claims made for it. 
They are all directed toward one single purpose-to persuade 
this court not to decide this case, because, after all, as we 
paraphrase, ((approval of an application is of no consequence; 
neither the State Engineer nor the trial court have the power 
to decide anything; and an application is not an appropriation. 
There is no necessity to decide anything here, because every-
thing can be decided elsewhere." 
But why Eardley vs. Terry has been cited to any purpose 
of Respondents is something we are unable to understand, for 
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this is a case in which the court has defined the duties of the 
State Engineer and the trial court to be precisely those \ve 
have consistently and persistently attributed to him. We are 
inclined to repeat here what we have already quoted fron1 
the opinion, but, looking over what has already been given, 
\ve see that it is clearly sufficient. Nevertheless, there are 
certain expressions so definitely and decisively in accord with 
our own ideas t4at we give them again. (Last paragraph, 
page 3 73 <t ••• the State Engineer is required to detet·mine .. 
. " etc. (Top of page 3 74) rry he State Engineer is 1·equired 
to determine ... " etc. (Middle of page 274) (( ... the trial 
court is required to determine the same questions de novo/} 
(page 3 77) rrlt must determine .. . n That, we suggest, settles 
that; and so far as anything can be, Eardley vs. Terry also settles 
what is to be determined. The court is explicit, and so is the 
statute. That the determination may be upset in another 
and independent proceeding has nothing, and of course -it has 
nothing, whatever to do with the matter. rry he State Engineer 
is required to determine.'' 
Rocky Ford Irrigation Company vs. Kents Lake, etc. Com-
pany, 104 Utah 202 
((In a trial de novo in the district court, the court found 
on the conflicting evidence that there was unappropriated 
water during certain high water seasons, and that the applicant 
could put the water to a beneficial use. Therefore, unless it 
appears that the approval of the application will injure the 
vested rights of prior appropriators, the application to ap-
propriate should be approved. See 100-3-8, Utah Code 
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Annotated 1943; Little Cottonwood Water Company vs. 
Kimball.'' 
The applicant's proposed storage reservoir was upstream 
from the place of diversion of one proh~sant and from a power 
plant, but (( ... we should not deny this application merely 
because it puts Kents Lake in a position, as the upstream 
junior appropriator} where it might, when sufficient water 
was not available for all concerned, interfere with the plaintiff's 
rights." Clearly not, it seems to us; that is a common situation. 
To hold otherwise would prohibit a large part of the water 
uses of the state. 
This case is cited as follows: ((It is only where there i~ 
no probability that the application might be perfected that the 
State Engineer should deny the application. Such was the 
holding of the court in Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. vs. Kents 
Lake Res. Co." 
We seem to remember that this was noticed some place 
above. Certainly that was not the ((holding of the court" in 
that case, and anyone who can read ought to be aware of it. 
Neither is it the ((holding" of any other case that has come 
before the Supreme Court of Utah. The trouble with the last 
quoted statement is the same as with so very many others in 
Respondent's original and Reply briefs. What is said is 
obviously n·ot ((the holding" of the Court in any case; but we 
read and re-read case after case to see if there was some (tfugi-
tove expression" identical or similar or of the same meaning. 
The Court may have said it in some case .in relation to some-
thing else; for example, it may have spoken of the probability 
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of an applicant's being able to do the things necessary to perfect 
the appropriation which approval authorizes him to commence. 
Then we think of Eardley vs. Terry which is certainly perfectly 
clear as to the prerequisites of approval, and we seem to recall 
use of the word ((probability" in it; so we read that for the- Nth 
time and find it, but there we find it as part of a sentence in 
which there are some sixty words of context not given by 
counsel. 
We are moved to waste that much space and time, as well 
as money, because we have, at last, come to the end of the 
Attorney General's brief-just before his ((Summary", where 
he says, ((This court has always told the State Engineer that 
the mere fact that a man is given a ((fighting" right high on 
a stream is no justification for refusing his application. See 
Rocky Ford Irr. Co. vs. Kents Lake, supra." Well, what of it? 
Naturally, the mere fact that an applicant is upstream is no 
ground for ttrefusing his application." But where has there 
been any mention of a ((fighting" right? 
Now we come to the Attorney General's ((Summary," upon 
which we shall comment sentence by sentence with our com-
ments in italics. 
((The Supreme Court has told the State Engineer that he 
has no judicial powers; that he must not, in ruling on an 
application, attempt to adjudicate or determine vested rights." 
True he has no judicial powers, but rr • •• the State Engineer 
is required to determine whether there is unappropriated 
water in the proposed source of supply and whether the water 
sought to be appropriated can be put to a beneficial use and 
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can be diveretd from the sourc~ of supply without doing injury 
to the prior rights of others." Eardley vs. Terry 94 Utah 367 
at 373. 
rrw hen an appeal is taken from the decision of the State 
Engineer in such a case, the trial court is required to determine 
the source questions de novo. It determines whether the 
application should be approved or rejected and does not fix 
the rights of the parties beyond the determination of that 
matter. The issues remain the same upon an appeal to this 
court. All that the district court or this court, an appeal from 
the district court, is called upon to do is to determine whether 
the application should be rejected or approved. If it appears 
that the1'e is unappropriated water which the applicant seeks 
to appropriate and which he can beneficially use without injury 
to or conflict with the prior rights of others, then the appli-
cation should be approved by the Court; otherwise it should 
be rejected.n Eardly vs. Terry, 94 Utah 367 at 3 74. 
nOn the question of vested rights the State Engineer is 
to make only a very general inquiry.'' 
''The State Engineer is required to detertnine." 
( (If, after such an inquiry, he has any reasonable basis 
for believing that a right might be perfected, he is to resolve 
such doubts in favor of approval." 
"All right, if ''he has any reasonable basis," but there is 
none in this case where the amount in question is only a small 
part of the total. There are no doubts to be resolved. There 
is no "probability" or possibility of any left over. And the1'e 
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is no probability that the P-ro,vo River Water Users Association 
u'ill abandon its rights. They a1·e being exercised at this 
moment. They have been continuously exe,rcised for approxi-
mately the last three years. Finding of Fact No. 7. 
((The Supreme Court has also said that an application 
to appropriate water is not an appropriation and that waters 
covered only by application are still not appropriated.'' 
Certainly an application is not an appropriation, and 
certainly the Supreme Court has said so. Certainly, however, 
appt·oval of an application authorizes the making of an 
app,.opriation. (If an application is approved, rrthe applicant 
then proceeds to demonstrate by an actual use of the rights 
sought to be acquired that he is entitled to such rights.n Earley 
vs. Terry 94 Utah 367 at 376. Section 8 Ch 3 Title 100 Utah 
Code Annotated 1943.) Equally certain it is that the Supreme 
Cout't has NOT said rrthat waters covered only by an applica-
tion are still not appropriated." To say that an application 
is not an appropriation or that approval of an application 
confers no rrfinal right~ or that the facts or conclusions upon 
which approval is based may be questioned in another pro-
ceeding, are all sayings of very different character from that 
attributed to the court by counsel. To say rr that waters covered 
only by an application are still not appropriated" is to say 
something that everyone knows is not true. For illustration 
we need to go no farther afield than the facts of this case. 
During the yea1~s 1944, 1945, 1946, and 1947, the Provo River 
Water Users Association, acting under the authority of the 
approved Weber River applications of the United States, 
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diverted flood waters of the Weber River into the Weber-
Provo Division canal which is a part of the completed works 
of the Deer Creek Division of the Provo River Project. Those 
flood waters were transported through a nine mile canal 
to the Provo River and by means of it into the Deer Creek 
Reservoir. From there theY. were turned into the Provo Reser-
voir Canal and were utilized to produce crops on some 40,000 
acres of land. 
All of those waters-several hundred thousand acre feet 
-are rrwaters covered only by an application/' NOT APPRO-
PRIATED!!! 
But counsel may mean (distinguished fronz what he said) 
that the flood waters so appropriated were not appropriated 
UNTIL taken into the canal, etc. But the United States had 
the right to divert them. It has exercised its right for four 
successive years-ever since its diverting works and storage 
reservoir have been completed. It has expended upwards of 
twenty million dollars with no other purpose. One might add 
that, in the sense of what tve are supposing counsel to have 
1neant, no waters, whether covered by Certificate, Decree, Ap-
proved Application or General AdjudicationJ are actually AP-
PROPRIATED until diverted. 
To say that the Supre1ne Court has said what is attributed 
to it is, to say the least, uncomplementary. To use the ridiculous 
statement as the basis for an argument that in spite of the 
facts stated above there is still unappropriated water in the 
pro posed source, if rr covered only by applications" ts some-
thing beyond our liberty to characterize. 
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((The court has also said that waters running to waste 
are for the time being public waters open to appropriation, 
and that waters which have escaped from the control of the 
original appropriator and returned to the natural source of 
supply again become public waters.', 
It might just as well be said that waters diverted from 
the Weber River into the Provo u'ere running to waste while 
on their way to Deer Creek Reservoir, or that all the watet· 
in the Provo on its way to Utah Lake is rrrunning to waste." 
Furthermore, these are NOT waters which have returned or 
ever will return to nthe natural source of supply." THEY ARE 
WATERS BROUGHT FROM A FOREIGN WATERSHED 
AND IMPOUNDED IN A STORAGE RESERVOIR. IT 
MAY WELL BE SAID THAT THEY ARE CREATED 
WATERS WHICH, UNLESS SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN 
ABANDONED, BELONG TO THE . CREATOR. 
"All three of the above are present in the instant case 
and combined they certainly suggest a reasonable doubt as 
to whether or not all of the waters are appropriated. There-
fore, the application should have been approved." 
What do the rrthree above" amount to, alone or conzbined! 
Three times zero is zero. 
UThe other issues as to ownership raised by the Amicus 
Curire simply ask this court to do what it has already told the 
State Engineer he must not do, to-wit: make an adjudication 
of vested rights." 
No such thing is asked. All that is asked is that there be 
done in this case what the statute and the decisions ·of this 
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.. 
court (everyone of them) direct shall be· done." The State 
Engineer is required to determine.n The District Court rrmust 
determine from the evidence whether there is probable cause 
to believe that there is unappropriated water which can be 
made available for use; that the applicant can beneficially use 
such appropriated water; and that such water can be diverted 
from the source of supply and used without injurY, to. or con-
flict with prior rights/' Eardley vs. Terry. 
There is something interesting, something curzous and 
astonishing, in this last sentence of Counsel's rrsummary/' 
elaborated elsewhere in the three briefs of Respondents. 
It has apparently never occurred to apply the rrstate En-
gineer has no judicial powers" to the ordinary case. It seems 
not to have occurred to either counsel that the inevitable result 
of their reasoning is that neither the State Engineer or the 
District Court can !/..either approve or disapprove an applica-
tion for right to appropriate. They can;t approve, for that 
necessarily involves a determination that all of the waters 
of the proposed source have not been appropriated and that 
there are no conflicting rights. They can't disapprove, for 
that involves a determination that there is no unappropriated 
water in the proposed source and that there are other rights 
U'hich exhaust it. 
· It would never occur to either respondent to argue that 
the State Engineer could not approve the Jones applications 
because that result necessarily involved a determination that 
the waters ·in question were not within the rights of Lehi Irri-
gation Company. Neither would it occur to eithe1~ to argue 
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that the case would have to be reversed if the District Court 
had rejected the Jones applications because it had determined 
that the waters in question u·ere and always had been con-
tributory to Dry Ct·eek and that Lehi Irrigation Company had 
(no matter how) long since acquired the right to use them! 
Curiously and astonishingly} however, the rights of the 
United States and the Provo River Water Users Association 
may not be rrdetermined" because rrthis Court ... has already 
told the State Engineer he must not ... make an adjudication 
of vested rights~ 
We have very carefully examined all of the decisions 
and all of the expressions of this court direct! y or indirect! y 
relating to the matter before it here, with the result that we 
have no doubt of the source of Respondent's confusion. THE 
CASE IS UNIQUE. No new or unusual principles of law 
are involved; it is the tacts that are peculiar. In almost every 
other case of its kind that has been brought to this court the 
rights of the actually contending parties have either been, or 
they have seemed to be, or it has not appeared that they were 
not, the only rights relevant to the issue. Sowards and Meagher, 
Rocky Ford Irrigation Company and Telluride Power Com-
jany and Kents Lake Irrigation Company, Eardley and the 
Terrys, etc., etc., so that in some instances the matter has been 
spoken of and treated as though it has been a ((private dispute"; 
and so in practical effect it has been. But in no case has this 
court failed to enunciate the principles involved in any sub-
stance or effect differently than in Eardley vs. Terry. 
Never before, so far as we have been able to discover, 
has any of the actually contending parties brought before the 
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court rights and interests of a person or persons not contending. 
But that was done here; and, in response to direction of the 
statute, and in response to the uniform pronouncements of 
this court, they must be considered. 
It may be recalled that some place above we have used 
the word ((unworthy" in reference to the ((third party" argu-
ment. What we had in mind is the fact that everyone knows, 
and especially everyone associated with the State Engineer 
knows, that not only is the State Engineer required by law to 
"determine" rights and interests of persons not before him-
protest or no protest-but also that it has been the uniform 
practice of the present State Engineer and of every one of his 
predecessors to do so. 
We do not suggest that the ((determination" required 
to be made by the State Engineer or, an appeal from his 
decision, by the trial court, calls for . anything in practical 
effect in the nature of the general adjudication suit, or that 
an applicant is bound at peril to approval to ((ferret out" all 
possibilities of conflict. What we do suggest, and urge as 
perfectly clear and obvious, is that the Engineer is bound to 
notice the records of his own office, and that, while neither 
he nor the District Court can be blamed or over-ruled for 
failure to consider rights not known or brought to attention, 
both are bound to consider and determine the effect of rights 
that are. 
But both Respondents say this court ought not to do so. 
"We assert that this court should not do so." (Page 4 Reply 
of Attorney General). Pages 13 and 14 are devoted to a 
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relation of alleged facts as to claims made by Utah Lake Users, 
and their intentions in relation to the very well known inten-
tions of the United States. ((Those parties have argued in the 
past that the Bureau of Reclamation and the Provo River Water 
Users Association cannot retain title to seepage waters after 
they escape into Utah Lake and they have indicated that they 
will oppose any attempt to perfect such a scheme for recaptur-
ing and · reusing this water.'' 
That's interesting indeed, but what has it to qo with this 
case? The writer has known for several years that certain 
(<parties have argued in the past ... " etc.; they are the parties 
who opposed approval of application 12144 passed on by this 
court in Tanner vs. Bacon State Engineer, 103 Utah 494 
referred to in our original brief at considerable length. 
For one reason or another it is argued that, Amicus Curire 
having come into this case, it must be ((by-passed." It must 
not be critically examined because, as it is said, there is nothing 
of any importance involved anyway. Then also it must not be 
decided because many will be affected by it. 
We have been under the impression that the only issue 
that can be presented is whether the Respondent Jones has or 
has not made a case for the approval of his applications. The 
facts which determine that it ought to be rejected were brought 
to attention by him. That was all right as long as their effect 
was to defeat the claims personal to Lehi Irrigation Company 
-was all right as to counsel for Jones and Counsel for the 
State Engineer so long as the case seemed to be going by default. 
In deciding the matter submitted to the State Engineer 
and to the district Court, and now before this court, it was 
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necessary, of course, as it is, to determine the legal effect. of 
the facts. In a simple action for trespass it may be necessary 
to decide as to the legal effects of long occupancy of real 
property. In Falkenberg vs. Neff, an action for damages, 
it was necessary to decide and the court did decide that one 
party had certain rights under a pending application to appro-
priate, etc., so that the decision is one as to water rights as well 
as to damages. In Sowards vs. Meagher in order to decide 
that one application was properly approved and another 
properly rejected it was necessary to decide whether waters 
on and intended for use on an Indian Reservation were subject 
to appropriation. It is often so, but in no case is the necessity 
of deciding affected by the fact that the decision will be of 
wide or of narrow significance. 
This court said in Eardley vs. Terry, and we think that 
under the circumstances it was necessary to say . . . ((It seems 
clear to us that the Legislature intended that when the appli-
cation is filed, the State Engineer is called upon to determine 
preliminarily whether there is probable cause to believe that 
an application can be perfected, having due regard to whether 
there is unappropriated water available for appropriation, 
whether it can be put to a beneficial use, and whether it can 
be diverted and so used without injuring or conflicting with 
the prior rights of others. If he determines there is such 
probability, the application is approved and the applicant 
then proceeds to demonstrate by an actual use of the rights 
sought to be acquired that he is entitled to such rights." 
Now it seems perfectly clear to us that the facts as to 
the waters in the proposed source are such that so far from 
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it being probable that ((the application can be perfected,, it 
is highly improbable, almost certain, that it cannot be. That 
approval might be the occasion of litigation is .not in itself 
sufficient to compel rejection, but here it can result in nothing 
but litigation, and that is sufficient. 
Regardless of Application No. 12144, the facts found 
establish that the waters in question result from an appropria-
tion made from a foreign watershed, and thus have been saved 
from wastage into Great Salt Lake; that they have been stored 
in a reservoir constructed to receive and conserve them; that 
they have been reduced to actual possession by the United States 
as an essential part of the water supply of a great reclamation 
project. In practical effect, they have been creat~d. Are these 
facts of any legal consequence? Are these waters, having once 
been used, now subject to appropriation by a stranger without 
a showing or attempt to show that they have been abandoned 
by those responsible for their existence? Respondents urge that 
by . some hocus pocus this question be left unanswered. 
If those facts are of no legal effect noticeable on applica-
tion to appropriate the waters so realized, how can this court 
avoid saying so? And if they are--if under those facts those 
waters are not subject to appropriation without showing of 
abandonment by their creator, how can this court avoid saying 
that? 
Except for the fact and effect of Application No. 12144, 
there is in this case nothing but that question worthy of any 
time or space whatever; and we regret the long and obstacle-
strewn road necessary to reach it. This. is the question .in aid of 
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which we referred the court to Ide vs. United States and United 
States vs. Haga, in our original brief, pages 16-18 as to the 
former, and pages 22-23 as to the latter. 
In Ide vs. United States, the controversy was between 
parties who, upon application to the State Engineer, had re-
ceived permission to perfect an appropriation of the seepage 
waters, on one side, and the United States whose construction 
and operation of the Shoshone Project had produced them, on 
the other. That is to say, the same controversy that would in-
evitably ensue between Jones and the United States if the Jones 
applications were approved. The court said-and this is its 
decision-·· ... the artificial flow was not available, because the 
plaintiff (United States) was entitled and intending to use it. 
The asserted appropr~ations, therefore, derive no support from 
the permits.'' And so, as here, their granting produced, and 
could produce, nothing except litigation. 
The court held, on a claim of abandonment by the United 
States, that there had been none, adding, ··As making against 
this conclusion, the defendants say that the plaintiff, in 1910, 
applied to the state engineer for a permit authorizing it to 
divert water from the ravine for the irrigation of particular 
lands, and that the application was returned without approval. 
But we find no evidence of abandonment in this. If the appli-
cation shows anything material in this connection, it is that the 
plaintiff was then intending to divert and use the seepage. 
The reason given by the state engineer for returning the appli-
cation without approval was that the irrigation of the particular 
lands was "already covered" by the plaintiff's existing permit. 
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Certainly nothing \Vas lost by the application or by the engin-
eer· s action thereon.'' 
A similar, though not quite identical, argument is n1ade 
in the Reply of Respondent Jones. We quote from page 23. 
"And of course, the Government must have considered its filing 
No. 12144 to be on unappropriated water, and on water, ac-
cording to the previous argument as to the statutes (A. 10), 
\vhich the Engineer must have found were unappropriated 
waters before approving this application. Then, if these waters 
were unappropriated and subject to this lower filing by the 
Government itself, how can Amicus Curiae, speaking here for 
the Government, contend as against us that the same waters 
were already appropriated by the Weber River filing. The 
Government's actions do not conform with the assertions of 
its spokesman." 
We might answer this in the language of the Supreme 
Court: ·1f the application shows anything material in this 
connection, it is that the United States was then intending to 
divert and use the seepage. Certainly nothing was lost by the 
application or the engineers' action thereon." 
The general principles underlying the decisions-Ide vs. 
United States and United States vs. Haga-are so coge·nt and 
compelling and so appropriate, that we repeat them in part 
from the opinions ... In point of law the general principle upon 
which the plaintiff relies is scarcely open to controversy; one 
\vho by the expenditure of money and labor diverts appropri-
able water from a stream, and thus makes it available for fruit-
ful purposes, is entitled to its exclusive control so long as he is 
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able and willing to apply it to beneficial uses, and such right 
extends to what is commonly known as wastage from surface 
run-off and deep percolation, necessarily incident to practical 
irrigation. ,Considerations of both public policy and natural 
justice strongly support such a rule." 
It 1nay be noticed that neither Respondent makes any 
attempt vvhatever to question either the result or the reasoning 
of these cases. The Attorney General fails to so much as touch 
them, and Respondent Jones' Reply does not mention them ex-
.. cept to say the actions were of a different character. 
In his original brief, Respondent Jones did not refer to 
United States vs. Haga at all, but sought to distinguish Ide vs. 
United States on the facts. Our comments upon .the attempt as 
to the facts begins with the last paragraph of page 18 of our 
original brief, and continues to page 21. Of course the actions 
were of different character. The cases are cited, as we have 
stated again and again, to the end of determining that the 
waters the right to appropriate which is sought by Jones are 
not the subject of appropriation by him, and so that there is no 
unappropriated water in the proposed source, and that the 
proposed use would impair existing rights, and so that it is 
inzprobable to the utmost degree that the right sought could ever 
be perfected. 
Suppose that what was said by the Federal Court and by the 
Supreme Court of the United States ((In point of law the gene-
ral principle upon which the plaintiff relies is scarcely open 
to controversy; one who by the expenditure of money and labor 
diverts appropriable water from a stream, and thus makes it 
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available for fruitful purposes; is entitled to its erclusive con-
trol so long as he is able and willing to apply it to beneficial 
uses, and such right extends to \V hat is common! y known as 
\vastage from surface run-off and deep percolation, necessarily 
incident to practical irrigation. Considerations of both public 
policy and natural justice strongly support such a rule." had 
been said by the Supreme Court of Utah; would Jones' Counsel 
say: (ty es, but that was said in an action of different form!" 
We hope not. 
If Respondents had argued that what we have quoted \vas 
pure dictum or that the principles enunciated by the Supreme 
Court "'ere unsound, and that this court ought not to agree, the 
argument, however unreasonable, would at least be understand-
able. 
Now the argument made (Jones Reply, page 23) is the 
one we have already touched upon, viz.: ttAnd of course, the 
Government must have considered its filing No. 12144 to be 
an unappropriated water, and on water, according to the pre-
vious argument as to the statutes (A. 10), which the Engineer 
must have found were unappropriated waters before approving 
this application. Then, if these waters were unappropriated and 
subject to this lower filing by the Government itself, how can 
Amicus Curiae, speaking for the Government, contend as 
against us that the same waters were already appropriated by 
the Weber River filing. The Government's actions do not con-
form with the assertions of its spokesman.'' 
The answer of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
similar situation, we have given under this same quotation a 
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page or so above; but that answer, however sufficient, is scarcely 
as pointedly decisive as the one about to appear below. 
((And of course,'' it is said, t(the Government must have 
considered its filing No. 12144 to be an unappropriated 
water ... " EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE; the 
making of application 12144 was an affirmance by the United 
States that the right to the use of the seepage waters ( t a result 
of the construction and operation of the Deer Creek Reservoir" 
belonged to it-that those waters were NOT unappropriated. 
tt ... and on water, according to previous argument as 
to the statutes (A. 10) which the Engineer must have found 
were unappropriated waters before approving this application." 
EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE. Before, and as a 
prerequisite to his approval of Application No. 12144, the 
State Engineer must have found the right to the use of the 
seepage and return flow to accrue from ttthe construction and 
operation of Deer Creek Reservoir" vested in the Applicant, 
the United States of America. 
tt ... Then, if these waters were unappropriated and 
subject to this lower filing by the Government itself, how can 
Amicus Curire, speaking here for the Government, contend as 
against us that the same waters were already appropriated 
by the Weber River filing . . . " 
But, as we have said, ttthese waters" the subject of the 
Government's Application No. 12144, were not unappro~ 
priated, and the very fact of the filing of Application No. 
12144 asserted that they were not. That application asserted 
them to have been, or that when they accrued from the con~ 
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struction and operation of the Deer Creek reservoir, they would 
be already appropriated. That is to say, as early as April 3, 
1936, the United States gave public notice of its intention to 
recapture and re-store and reuse the seepage to accrue from 
the construction and operation of Deer Creek Reservoir, among 
\vhich are the waters-now identified as such-the subject 
of the Jones Application; and, in doing so, it then did the 
very opposite of that which Respondent mistakenly infers. 
Just as soldiers, faced with the anxieties of combat, fre-
quently develop all sorts of disabling infirmities, so the zeal 
of counsel for Respondent has ieveloped a psychological 
((blind spot." 
Application No. 12144 is not an Application to APPRO-
PRIATE at all. It is an application to store and EXCHANGE 
waters already appropriated-as the application itself expressly 
states-rrWaters belonging to the United States which will 
flow into and augment the water supply of Utah Lake as a 
result of the construction and operation of Deer Creek Reser-
voir." 
The application was made pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 20, Chapter 3, Title 100, entitled, (CRight to Convey 
Appropriated Waters Into Natural Streams and to Impound." 
It reads in part: cc ••• upon application in writing and approval 
of ~e State Engineer, any appropriated water may ... " etc., etc. 
Counsel has not noticed the language used in referring 
to this _Application in our original brief, (page 31). CCBy this 
application the United States confirmed its right to recapture; 
and it declared its intention to recapture, waters accruing to 
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Utah Lake by the 'seepage and return flow' of waters stored 
in and used from the Deer Creek Reservoir and to exchange 
them for direct flow rights in the Provo River." "The rights 
of the United States confirmed by this Application are vital 
to the water supply of the Provo River Project." 
The Application expressly alleged that the waters proposed 
to be exchanged were already appropriated-more than that 
even-that they belonged to the United States,-an expression 
fully permissible under the circumstances. 
Approval of the Application necessarily involved a deter-
mination by the State Engineer that the right to the use of the 
waters the subject of th~ Application belonged to the United 
States; and such a determination was also implicit in the 
decision of the State Engineer, the decision of the District 
Court and in the decision of this court in Tanner vs. Bacon 
State Engineer, 103 Utah, 394, for prerequisite to the right of 
exchange is the right to use the waters exchanged. 
The result is that the principles, the foundation of the 
decisions of Ide vs. United States and United States vs. Haga, 
sufficient in themselves to affirm the rights of the United 
States totally irreconcilable with approval of the Jones Appli-
cations, have long since been affirmed by the State Engineer 
and by this court. And why not? Who will deny that the 
result was directed by rr considerations of both public policy 
and natural justice.n 
Is it probable that there is unappropriated water in the 
proposed source, or that the proposed use will not impair 
existing rights? Is it probable that the Jones Applications 
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can be perfected? Is it not true that their approval could have 
no other result than litigation, the necessity for which may 
be obviated by the rejection in1pelled by the facts? 
In his Reply, Respondent Jones is driven to the desperate 
expediant of urging that the District Court did not find that all 
of the 'vaters involved were the result of the use of Deer Creek 
storage, but only rrsubstantially all," and to assert that some 
accrued as early as 1913, referring to the transcript. 
We have not examined the testimony, for the all suf-
ficient reason that it is not open to us, any more than it is open 
to Appellant or Respondent to question the findings of fact 
of the trial court. The facts of this case are those found. 
The findings in each of the three consolidated casse are 
identical except as to the rate of flow, which in one case is (~7 
cubic feet per second-for irrigation"; in another, (~6 cubic 
feet per second-for irrigation"; and in the other, (: 5 cubic 
feet per second-for irrigation." 
rrsuch water (in each case) ((is from increased flow in a 
spring and spring area due to increased seepage from an en-
larged canal and extensive increased irrigation at higher levels 
from waters stored at Deer Creek Reservoir on the Provo River, 
and which waters so used and so seeping and arising in de-
fendant's land are substantially all waters diverted from Weber 
River Irrigation System to the Provo River and to Deer Creek 
Reservoir." (Finding No. 6.) 
rry he waters thus and here involved" (in each case) have 
arisen during approximately the last three years ... " (Finding 
No.7). 
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There is no finding of the existence of any increased flow 
except ccfrotn waters stored at Deer Creek Reservoir," or any 
arising except during ccapproximately the last three years." 
It is hardly possible, we think, for this court to say that the 
applicant may now proceed in accord with the statute c:to take 
all steps required to apply the water to the use named and to 
perfect the proposed appropriation''-" except as to substan-
tially all of the said waters.n ctSubstantially all" in its context 
of finding No. 6 must mean ccall of any consequence." 
In our original brief we gave it as our opinion that the 
Provo River Project of the United States Bureau of Reclamation 
is judicially known, and commencing on page 25 and continuing 
to include page 28, we gave our reasons. Nothing said up to 
this point is dependept upon the validity of the opinion there 
expressed and supported, for our conclusions from it stated 
beginning at page 28 of our first brief, add very little to the 
more than fifty references to Deer Creek, its enlarged canal, 
its reservoir, its Weber diversions, and its general plan supplied 
by Court and Counsel at the trial, in the findings and by the 
original briefs of both Appellant and Respondent. In regard 
to this last, we are unable to resist mention of the naive state-
ment of Counsel that his rather detailed account of the real 
facts of Deer Creek was only for the purpose of showing that 
the facts of Ide vs. United States were different. 
Nevertheless, and important or not, we are still of the 
opinion formerly expressed. The Special Assistant Attorney 
General has little if anything to say of the matter, agreeing 
rather, as it seems to us, but urging that in no event ought 
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any consideration to be given to the facts relative to the Pr?ject 
however disclosed. Counsel for Respondent Jones, however, 
disagrees entirely and cites a half dozen or so authorities said 
to be opposed. We have not looked into them, being content 
with the general statement of one of them as given by him. 
"In other words, judicial knowledge is measured by general 
knowledge of the same facts." We have seen this expressed 
elsev.rhere as t(The court knows what everyone else knows." 
Without pretending to any expertness in this field, we 
hope we may still give our view on what ought to be. It seems 
to us that the judicial knowledge of the Supreme Court of 
Utah, while. comprehending a great deal that is known to the 
courts of other jurisdictions, also includes a great deal that is 
peculiar to Utah, and it seems to us that, in addition to much 
else, it ought to include that which for considerably more 
than a quarter of a century has. been the subject of official 
solicitude of the State of Utah-of the Provo River Project 
of which there could be said in the year 1943 what was said 
of it by Mr. Justice Wade in Tanner vs. Bacon, State Engineer, 
commencing at page 501 of 103 Utah, and by Mr. Justice Wolf 
at page 511; the latter saying something especially appropriate 
to the merits of this case: 
"Suffice it to say in this case that the Deer Creek 
Project reached a point in conception and realization 
where it could definitely be said to be against public 
interest to affirm any application which would interfere 
with its fruition.'' 
A Project of such vital significance to the State of Utah that, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
74 
as the court held, interference with its water right under Ap-
plication No. 12144, basicly deriving from its Weber River 
rights, \vas detrimental to the public welfare, even as against 
a filing made eleven years before. Most of its water rights 
were initiated by the State itself, and were passed to it by 
special act of its legislature. 
In our original brief, at page 27, we said, ('in point of 
expenditure of money, of effort, of engineering works, and 
of benefits, the Provo River Project is the greatest public 
enterprise so far undertaken in the State of Utah'' and we 
might properly have added, "and by the State of Utah." We 
also stated the fact (page 26) that various reports-official 
documents of the State and of the United States--concerning 
it were given to the public on three separate occasions. 
All in all, it seems to us that its public character alone 
compels Judicial knowledge of it. As to the nature and extent 
of this we invite attention to our original brief pages 25 to 27. 
In addition, there is the fact that for many years the 
project has been the subject of a publicity in the public press, 
broader in scope, more detailed, and more persistent than any 
other enterprise, public or private has ever received in the 
State of Utah. It commenced many years ago with the com-
mencement of public and official interest, and has continued, 
scarcely unabated in intensity to this day. The effect can hardly 
be better exemplified than it is in the mere fact of Finding 
No. 6 of this cause. 
Is it possible that this court, as such, does not know of 
the existence of the pfi-vate enterprise known as the Utah 
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Copper Mine, that it is the largest open cut copper mine 1n 
North America, that it produces a large tonnage of low grade 
ore, and even that its ores are refined by what is known as the 
flotation process? (CEveryone else" in the State of Utah 
knows these things; but of the Provo River Project everyone 
is reminded almost every day, and a large proportion of the 
State's population is affected by it, and the welfare-aln1ost 
the continued existence-of its capital city is dependent upon it. 
Permit us to state once more the principles of law which, 
as we see it, are controlling in this case, and a barest outline 
of the facts the effect of which they will ndetermine." 
Applications to appropriate certain alleged unappro-
propriated public waters of the State of Utah were filed with 
the State Engineer. The State Engineer was thereupon ( t re-
quired to determine whether there" was ((unappropriated water 
in the proposed source of supply and whether the water sought 
to be appropriated" could ((be put to beneficial use and" could 
((be diverted from the source of supply without doing material 
injury to the prior rights of others" Section 8, Chapter 3, 
Title 100, Utah Code Annotated 1943; Eardley vs. Terry. 
The Application, having been disposed of by the State 
Engineer, was brought before the District Court under Section 
14 of Chapter 3. Thereupon the District Court was ((required 
to determine the same questions de novo.'' 
If it ((appeared to the" District Court (Cthat there" was 
ccunappropriated water which the applicant" sought ((to ap-
propriate and which he" could ((beneficially use without 
injury to or conflict with the prior rights of others, then the 
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application should" have been ''approved ·by the court;'' 
"otherwise it should" have been ((rejected." 
The facts found by the District Court, ((establish that 
the waters in question result from an appropriation made from 
a foreign watershed, and thus have been saved from wastage 
into Great Salt Lake; that they have been stored in a reservoir 
constructed to receive and conserve them; that they have been 
1'educed to actual possession by the United States as an essential 
part of the v1ater supply of a great reclamation project. In 
practical effect, they have been created. Are these facts of 
any legal consequence? Are these waters, having been once 
used, now subject to appropriation by a stranger without a 
showing or attempt to show that they have been abandoned 
by those responsible for their existence?'~ 
There is no other issue in this case except that; and, its 
"determination" it seems to us, is logically .impelled by the 
reasoning of Ide vs. United States and United States vs. Haga: 
" 'In point of lavv the general principle upon which 
the plaintiff relies is scarcely open to controversy; one 
who by the expenditure of money and labor diverts 
appropriable water from a stream, and thus makes it 
available for fruitful purposes, is entitled to its ex-
clusive control so long as he is able and willing to 
apply it to beneficial uses, and such right extends to 
what is commonly known as wastage from surface run-
off and deep percolation, necessarily incident to practi-
cal irrigation. Considerations of both public policy and 
natural justice strongly support such a rule. Nor is it 
essential to his control that the appropriator maintain 
continuous actual possession of such water. So long 
as he does not abandon it or forfeit it by failure to use, 
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he may assert his rights. It is not necessary that he 
confine it upon his own land or convey it in an artificial 
conduit. It is requisite, of course, that he be able to 
identify it; but, subject to that limitation, he may con-
duct it through natural channels and may even com-
mingle it or suffer it to commingle with other waters. 
In short, the rights of an appropriator in these respects 
are not affected by the fact that the water has once 
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